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Title	Security Context Transfer for fast Re-authentication	
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Source(s)	Dongkie Lee, DongIl Moon, DongRyul Lee, JongKuk Ahn, Sungho Ha SK Telecom 15F, Seoul Finance Center, 84, Taepyungpro 1 ga, Chung-gu, Seoul, 100-768, Korea	Voice: +82-2-6323-3147 Fax: +82-2-6323-4493 [mailto: {galahad,dimoon,drlee,jgahn,ss23}@sktelecom.com]
Re:	Recirculation Ballot #14b Announcement	
Abstract	To minimize the handoff interruption time, fast authentication procedure is suggested and harmonized at handoff ad-hoc utilizing RNG-REQ with HMAC-Tuple. In order to send RNG-REQ with HMAC attached, security context shall be transferred from serving BS to target BS. In this contribution, informative text for security context transfer is proposed.	
Purpose	Discuss and Adopt	
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Security Context Transfer for fast Re-authentication

*Dongkie Lee, DongRyul Lee, DongIl Moon, JongKuk Ahn
SK Telecom*

1. Problem Statements

If the normal PKM initial network entry process as defined in 7.2 is to be abridged or omitted, then the MSS shall include the HMAC Tuple as the last message item in the RNG-REQ management message. If the required HMAC Tuple is invalid or omitted in the RNG-REQ management message, then the full PKM REQ/RSP sequence must be completed and cannot be omitted. The Target BS shall include a valid HMAC Tuple as the last message item in the RNG-RSP if it instructs the MSS, through the HO Process Optimization TLV, that the PKM-REQ/RSP sequence may be omitted.

2. Overview of Proposed Solutions

In order to support fast authentication, security context from serving BS to target BS should be transferred during handover procedure. In this contribution “Newer” backbone messages for security context transfer messages are defined: MSS Security Context Transfer Request, MSS Security Context Transfer Response

Table 1 Security Context Information

Type	Content
AK Related	“Older”er/”Newer”er {AK, Remaining lifetime, Key Sequence Number}
TEK Related	“Older”er/”Newer”er {TEK Parameters(TEK, Remaining Key-Lifetime, Key-Sequence-Number, CBC-IV), SAID} per SAID

3. Proposed Changes to IEEE 802.16e/D3

[Add the following after Pre-authentication section if it’s accepted:]

7.x.x.x Fast Re-Authentication with full security context transfer

After a HO-REQ/RSP exchange with the serving, an MSS may seek to use fast re-authentication to effect a fast handover with the target BS. If the full security context is transferred from the serving BS to the target BS and the normal PKM initial network re-entry is to be omitted, then the MSS shall include the HMAC Tuple as the last message item in the RNG-REQ management message. If the required HMAC Tuple is invalid or omitted in the RNG-REQ management message, then the full PKM REQ/RSP sequence must be completed and cannot be omitted. The target BS shall include a valid HMAC Tuple as the last message item in the RNG-RSP if it instructs the MSS, through the HO Process Optimization TLV, that the PKM-REQ/RSP sequence may be omitted.

[Add the following after D.2.13 BS-info-response message:]

D.2.14 MSS Security Context Transfer Request

This message is sent by a target BS to a serving BS or to an ASA server to request security context information of number of MSS' during handover process.

<u>Field</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Notes</u>
<u>Global Header</u>	<u>152-bit</u>	
<u>Message Type=?</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	
<u>For(j=0;j<Num Records; j++){</u>		
<u> MSS Unique identifier</u>	<u>48-bit</u>	<u>48-bit unique identifier of the MSS</u>
<u> }</u>		
<u>Security field</u>		<u>A means to authenticate this message</u>

D.2.15 MSS Security Context Transfer Response

This message is sent by a serving BS or ASA server to target BS to provide security context information of a MSS during handover process. This information maybe is used for fast re-authentication.

<u>Field</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Notes</u>
<u>Global Header</u>	<u>152-bit</u>	
<u>Message Type=?</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	
<u>For(j=0;j<Num Records; j++){</u>		
<u> MSS Unique identifier</u>	<u>48-bit</u>	<u>48-bit unique identifier of the MSS</u>
<u> “Older” AK</u>	<u>160-bit</u>	
<u> “Older” AK Remaining key Lifetime</u>	<u>32-bit</u>	
<u> “Older” AK Key Sequence Number</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	
<u> “Newer” AK</u>	<u>169-bit</u>	
<u> “Newer” AK Remaining key Lifetime</u>	<u>32-bit</u>	
<u> “Newer” AK Key Sequence Number</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	
<u> N_SAIE</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	<u>Number of Security Association Information Elements</u>
<u> For(k=0;k<N_SAIE;k++){</u>		
<u> SA Descriptor</u>	<u>Variable</u>	<u>These properties include the SAID, the SA type, and the cryptographic suite employed within the SA.</u>
<u> }</u>		
<u> For(k=0;k<N_SAIE;k++){</u>		
<u> “Older” TEK</u>		
<u> “Older” TEK Remaining key Lifetime</u>	<u>32-bit</u>	
<u> “Older” TEK Key Sequence Number</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	

<u>“Older” TEK CBC Init Vector</u>	<u>Equal to Block length of cipher</u>	
<u>“NEWER” TEK</u>		
<u>“Newer” TEK Remaining key Lifetime</u>	<u>32-bit</u>	
<u>“Newer” TEK Key Sequence Number</u>	<u>8-bit</u>	
<u>“Newer” TEK CBC Init Vector</u>	<u>Equal to Block length of cipher</u>	
<u>}</u>		
<u>}</u>		
<u>Security field</u>	<u>TBD</u>	<u>A means to authenticate this message</u>