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Title	Security Negotiation Parameters in t	he SBC-REQ/RSP Procedure
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Re:	IEEE P802.16e/D6	
Abstract	The document contains suggestions of	on the changes into IEEE 802.16e/D6 that would to negotiate between a MS and the BS.
Purpose	Adoption of proposed changes into P80	)2.16e/D6
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# Security Negotiation Parameters in the SBC-REQ/RSP Procedure Seokheon Cho, Taeyong Lee, Sunhwa Lim, and Chulsik Yoon

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## Introduction

Both MS and BS shall negotiate the authorization policy by using the Authorization Policy Support field. Both of them shall also know message authentication code mode, e.g. selecting one of OMAC and HMAC from the Authorization Policy Support field. However, the negotiation of message authentication code mode should be performed by other field that is independent from the Authorization Policy Support field, since the message authentication code mode level is lower than the authorization key level obtained through the authorization procedure.

In addition, there are two modes related to the EAP, e.g. EAP transfer mode and protected EAP transfer mode.

It is necessary to make a filed to contain parameters related to privacy capabilities.

This contribution proposed a way to solve the above problems.

# Proposed changes to IEEE 802.16e/D6

6.3.2.3.23 MS Basic Capability Request (SBC-REQ) message [Insert at the end of 6.3.2.3.23:]

Security Negotiation Parameters (see 11.8.4) Authorization Policy Support (see 11.8.4)

6.3.2.3.24 MS Basic Capability Response (SBC-RSP) message [Insert at the end of 6.3.2.3.24:]

**Security Negotiation Parameters (see 11.8.4) Authorization Policy Support (see 11.8.4)** 

# [Change sub-clauses 11.8.4 - 11.8.6 as follows]

#### 11.8.4 Security Negotiation Parameters

This field is a compound attribute indicating security capabilities to negotiate before performing the initial authorization procedure and the reauthorization procedure.

Type	Length	Value (compound)	Scope
25	Variable	The compound field contains the sub-attributes as defined in Table xxx.	SBC-REQ
	variable		SBC-RSP

Attribute	Contents
PKM Version Support	Version of privacy sublayer supported
Authorization Policy Support	Authorization policy to support
Message Authentication Code Mode	Message authentication code to support
PN Window Size	Size capability of the receiver PN window per SAID

## **11.8.5 11.8.4.1** PKM Version Support

This field indicates a PKM version. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported". Both an SS and a BS should negotiate only one PKM version.

Type	Length	Value	<del>Scope</del>
<del>26</del>		Bit# 0: PKM version 1	SBC REQ
25.1	1	Bit# 1: PKM version 2	SBC RSP
		Bit# 2-7: Reserved. Set to 0	

## 11.8.4 11.8.4.2 Authorization Policy Support

This field indicates authorization policy used by the MS and BS to negotiate and synchronize. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported."

Type	Length	Value	<del>Scope</del>
<del>5.25</del>		Bit# 0: RSA-based authorization	SBC-REQ
25.2		Bit# 1: EAP-based authorization	SBC-RSP
	1	Bit# 2: OMAC supported (if set to 0, HMAC is the	
	1	<del>default)</del>	
		Bit# 2: Protected EAP-based authorization	
		Bit# 3-7: Reserved. Set to 0	

Protected EAP-based authorization basically means that a message containing EAP payload is protected by OMAC Digest. The OMAC\_KEY\_U and OMAC\_KEY\_D are generated with the EIK obtained from RSA-based authorization or EAP-based authorization.

## 11.8.4.3 Message Authentication Code Mode

This field indicates a MAC (Message Authentication Code) mode that MS supports. Both MS and BS shall determine and use a MAC mode. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported." If this attribute is not present, only HMAC is supported.

Type	Length	Value
25.3		Bit# 0: OMAC
		Bit# 1: 64-bit short-HMAC*
	1	Bit# 2: 80-bit short-HMAC*
		Bit# 3: 96-bit short-HMAC*
		Bit# 4-7: Reserved. Set to 0

<sup>\*</sup> Note: If the short-HMAC mode is selected, then the short-HMAC tuple shall be applied to the following messages: MOB\_SLP-REQ/RSP, MOB\_SCAN-REQ/RSP, MOB\_MSHO-REQ, MOB\_BSHO-REQ/RSP, MOB\_HO-IND, RNG-REQ/RSP. Otherwise, the HMAC tuple shall be applied.

#### 11.8.6 11.8.4.4 PN Window Size

Specifies the size capability of the receiver PN window per SAID. The receiver shall track PNs within this window to prevent replay attacks (see 7.5.1.2.4).

Type	Length	Value	<del>Scope</del>
44 <del>.</del> 25.4	2	PN Window Size in PNs	SBC REQ, SBC RSP

[Change one row in Table 368 in the section 11.9 as follows]

11.9 PKM-REQ/RSP management message encodings

Table 368-PKM attributes types

Type	PKM attribute
22	<del>Version</del> reserved

[Change the sub-clause 11.9.13 as follows] 11.9.13 Security capabilities

Description: The Security-Capabilities attribute contains is a compound attribute whose subattributes identify the version of PKM an SS supports and the cryptographic suite(s) an SS supports.

Type	Length	Value (compound)
19	Variable	The Compound field contains the subattributes as defined in Table 372.

Table 372-Security-capabilities subattributes

Attribute	Contents
Cryptographic-Suite-List	List of supported cryptographic suites
Version	Version of Privacy supported

[Delete the sub-clause 11.9.16] 11.9.16 Version

Table 372-Security-capabilities subattributes

<del>Value</del>	<del>Description</del>
0	Reserved
1	PKM(Initial statndard release)

2 255 Reserved
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<del>Type</del>	Length	Value (compound)
22	1	A 1 byte code identifying a version of PKM security as defined in Table 377.