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| Abstract | Define a separate context for PMK and remove it from AK | |
| Purpose | Define a separate context for PMK and remove it from AK | |
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PMK context separation from AK context

Avishay Shraga

1. Motivation

According to EAP-review (<http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/review.txt>):

PMK is maintained in a higher and a separate entity then the AK (e.g. BS/Authenticator vs. BS port). Thus the PMK context definition shall be separated from the AK one,

2. Proposed solution

Extract PMK from the AK context. Create a separate PMK context and define the way it should be used and managed

3. Changes summary

[change 7.2.2.4.1 ak-context]

7.2.2.4.1 AK-context

The context of AK includes all the parameters connected to AK and keys derived directly from it. When one parameter from this context expires, a new AK should be obtained in order to start a new context.

Obtaining of new AK means re-authentication - doing the whole EAP and/or RSA authentication due to the authorization policies negotiated between the MS and BS until obtaining a new PMK and/or PAK which AK may be derived from.

Derivation of AK after HO is done separately in the MS and network from a common PMK, PAK, SSID and BSID. The PMK and/or PAK may be used to derive keys to several BSs sharing the same PMK and/or PAK.

In HO scenario, if the MS was previously connected to the TBS, the derived AK will be identical to the last one, as long as the PMK stays the same. In order to maintain security in this scenario: the context of the AK must be cached by both sides and to be used from the point it stopped, if context lost by one side, **re-authentication must be initiated by this side in order to create fresh PMK and AKs. In addition the Old PMK shall not be used any more to create or derive new AK contexts (including the one lost).**

The AK context is described in the table:

Table 133 – AK context for PKMv2

| context Parameter | S i z e | Usage |
|----------------------|------------------|-------|
| | | |

| | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|
| Primary AK (PAK) | 1 6 0 b i t | A key yielded from the RSA authorization |
| PAK sequence number | 4 b i t s | PAK sequence number, when the RSA-based authorization is achieved. The least significant 2 bits are the sequence counter, and the most significant 2 bits are set to zero. |
| PAK lifetime | | PAK lifetime, when the RSA-based authorization is achieved. |
| PMK | 1 6 0 - b i t s | A key yielded from the EAP-based authentication. |
| PMK lifetime | | PMK lifetime, when the EAP-based authorization is achieved and the AAA-key is obtained. The value of PMK lifetime may be transferred from the EAP method or may be set by a vendor. |
| PMK sequence number | 4 - b i t s | PMK sequence number, when the EAP-based authorization is achieved and a key is generated. The most significant 2 bits are the sequence counter. And the least significant 2 bits set to 0. |
| AK | 1 6 0 b i t | The authorization key, calculated as defined in 7.2.2.2.3 |
| AKID | 6 4 b i t s | AKID = Dot16KDF(AK, AK SN SSID BSID "AK", 64) |

| | | |
|--------------------|--|--|
| AK sequence number | 4 b i t s | Sequence number of root keys (PAK and PMK) for the AK. This value is the least significant 2-bit of PAK sequence number concatenated with the least significant 2-bit of PMK sequence number. If $AK = f(\text{PAK and PMK})$, then $AK\ SN = \text{PAK SN} + \text{PMK SN}$ If $AK = f(\text{PAK})$, then $AK\ SN = \text{PAK SN}$ If $AK = f(\text{PMK})$, then $AK\ SN = \text{PMK SN}$ |
| AK lifetime | | This is the time this key is valid; it is calculated $AK\ lifetime = \text{MIN}(\text{PAK lifetime, PMK lifetime}) - \text{when this expires, re-authentication is needed.}$ |
| H/OMAC_KEY_U | 1 6 0 / 1 2 8 b i t | The key which is used for signing UL management messages |
| H/OMAC_PN_U | 3 2 b i t | Used to avoid UL replay attack on management – when this expires re-authentication is needed |
| H/OMAC_KEY_D | 1 6 0 / 1 2 8 b i t | The key which is used for signing DL management messages |
| H/OMAC_PN_D | 3 2 b i t | Used to avoid DL reply attack on management – when this expires re-authentication is needed |

| | | |
|-----|----------|--|
| KEK | 160 bits | Used to encrypt transport keys from the BS to the SS |
|-----|----------|--|

7.2.2.4.X PMK-context

The context of PMK includes all the parameters connected to PMK.

This context is created once Authentication completed.

The parameters that affect the validity of this context is the PMK lifetime.

The PMK key has two lifetime update phases: the first is once context been created and the second is after the 3-way handshake have completed successfully.

The phases ensures that once PMK is created it will be defined with the default lifetime and after successful 3-way handshake, this lifetime may be enlarged using the PMK life time TLV within the 3-way handshake.

In order to maintain security and connectivity, when this context is about to expire re-authentication must be initiated.

The PMK context is described in the table XXX

| Parameter | Size | Usage |
|---------------------|----------|--|
| PMK | 160 bits | A key yielded from the EAP-based authentication. |
| PMK lifetime | | PMK lifetime, when the EAP-based authorization is achieved and the AAA-key is obtained. The value of PMK lifetime is set to the default value The 3-way handshake may change this value |
| PMK sequence number | 4 bits | PMK sequence number, when the EAP-based authorization is achieved and a key is generated. The most significant 2 bits are the sequence counter. And the least significant 2 bits set to 0. |

10.2 PKM parameter values

Insert to table 343

| System | Name | Description | Min value | Default value | Max value |
|--------|--------------|---|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| SS+BS | PMK lifetime | The lifetime assigned to PMK when created | 5sec | 10sec | 15min |

11.9.19 PKM configuration settings

| Type | Length | Value | Scope |
|------|----------|----------|--|
| 27 | Variable | Compound | Auth replay PMKv2-rsa reply sa-tek-response |

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11.9.19.8 PMK lifetime

| Type | Length | Value |
|------|--------|----------------------|
| 27.8 | 4 | PMK life time update |