<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group [<a href="http://ieee802.org/16">http://ieee802.org/16</a>]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>The Clarification of AK Context and Calculation of CMAC Digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Submitted</td>
<td>2005-07-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source(s)</td>
<td>Zhengfei Xiao, Yongmao Li, Phillip Barber, Jim Carlo, David Xiang, Duke Dang, Lucy Chen, John Lee</td>
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<td>Seokheon Cho</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taeyong Lee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HUAWEI</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>ETRI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Re: Call for contribution and comments.

Abstract
The Clarification of AK Context and Calculation of CMAC Digest.

Purpose
Adoption

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The Clarification of AK Context and Calculation of CMAC Digest
Zhengfei Xiao, Yongmao Li, Phillip Barber, Jim Carlo, David Xiang, Duke Dang, Lucy Chen, John Lee
HUAWEI

Problem Definition

To avoid replay attack, it should be ensured that the CMAC_PN_* in the management message received by
the BS or MS is always incremented and never repeated. So the standard should stress that MS shall complete
the re-authentication with BS and obtain a new AK before the CMAC_PN_* is expired.

Proposed Text Changes

[Remedy 1]

[Modify sub-clause 7.5.4.1, in page230 line36 as follows:]

7.5.4.1 Calculation of CMAC Value

The calculation of the keyed hash value contained in the CMAC-Digest attribute and the CMAC Tuple shall use
the CMAC Algorithm with AES. The downlink authentication key CMAC_KEY_D shall be used for
authenticating messages in the downlink direction. The uplink authentication key CMAC_KEY_U shall be used
for authenticating messages in the uplink direction. Uplink and downlink message authentication keys are
derived from the AK (see 7.5.4 below for details).

For authentication multicast messages (in the DL only) a CMAC_KEY_GD shall be used (one for each group),
group authentication key is derived from GKEK The CMAC-Digest and CMAC-Tuple attributes shall be only
applicable to the PKM version 2. In the PKM version 2 protocol, the CMAC key sequence number in the
CMAC tuple shall be equal to the 4-bit AK
sequence number of the AK from which the CMAC_KEY_x was derived.

The CMAC Packet Number Counter (CMAC_PN_*) is a 4 byte sequential counter that is incremented in the
context of UL messages by the MS, and in the context of DL messages by the BS,. The BS will also maintain a
separate CMAC_PN_* for multicast packets per each GSA and increment that counter in the context of each
multicast packet from the group. For MAC messages that have no CID e.g. RNG-REQ message, the
CMAC_PN_* context will be the same as used on the basic CID. If basic CID is unknown (e.g. in network
reentry situation) then CID 0 should be used.

The CMAC Packet Number Counter, CMAC_PN_*, is part of the CMAC security context and must be
unique for each MAC management message with the CMAC tuple or digest. Any tuple value of
{CMAC_PN_*, AK} shall not be used more than once. The MS shall initiate re-authentication when the
CMAC_PN_U reaches the half of its number space to obtain a new AK before it expires. The BS shall send the
Auth-Invalid message to MS when the CMAC_PN_D reaches the half of its number space.
The digest shall be calculated over a field consisting of the CMAC key sequence number followed by the CMAC Packet Number Counter, expressed as an unsigned 32-bit number, followed by the 16-bit Connection ID on which the message is sent, followed by 16-bit of zero padding (for the header to be aligned with AES block size) and followed by the entire MAC management message with the exception of the CMAC TLV.

The least significant bits of the digest shall be truncated to yield a 64-bit length digest. The CMAC key sequence number shall be equal to the 4-bit AK sequence number of the AK from which the CMAC_KEY_x was derived.

I.e.,:

\[
\text{CMAC value} \leq \text{Truncate64 (CMAC (CMAC_KEY_*, CMAC key sequence number | CMAC_PN | CID |16-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message) )}
\]

If the digest is included in an MPDU that has no CID, e.g. A RNG-REQ message, the CID used shall take the value of the basic CID. If basic CID is unknown (e.g. in network reentry situation) then CID 0 should be used.

[Remedy 2]

[Modify sub-clause 7.5.4.1, in page230 line36 as follows:]

7.5.4.1 Calculation of CMAC Value

The calculation of the keyed hash value contained in the CMAC-Digest attribute and the CMAC Tuple shall use the CMAC Algorithm with AES. The downlink authentication key CMAC_KEY_D shall be used for authenticating messages in the downlink direction. The uplink authentication key CMAC_KEY_U shall be used for authenticating messages in the uplink direction. Uplink and downlink message authentication keys are derived from the AK (see 7.5.4 below for details).

For authentication multicast messages (in the DL only) a CMAC_KEY_GD shall be used (one for each group), group authentication key is derived from GKEK The CMAC-Digest and CMAC-Tuple attributes shall be only applicable to the PKM version 2. In the PKM version 2 protocol, the CMAC key sequence number in the CMAC tuple shall be equal to the 4-bit AK sequence number of the AK from which the CMAC_KEY_x was derived.

The CMAC Packet Number Counter (CMAC_PN_*) is a 4 byte sequential counter that is incremented in the context of UL messages by the MS, and in the context of DL messages by the BS,. The BS will also maintain a separate CMAC_PN_* for multicast packets per each GSA and increment that counter in the context of each multicast packet from the group. For MAC messages that have no CID e.g. RNG-REQ message, the CMAC_PN_* context will be the same as used on the basic CID. If basic CID is unknown (e.g. in network reentry situation) then CID 0 should be used.

The CMAC Packet Number Counter, CMAC_PN_*, is part of the CMAC security context and must be unique for each MAC management message with the CMAC tuple or digest. Any tuple value of \{CMAC_PN_*, AK\} shall not be used more than once. The MS shall initiate re-authentication when the
CMAC_PN_U reaches the allowed maximum PN number for signaling message to obtain a new AK before it expires. The BS shall send the Auth-Invalid message to MS when the CMAC_PN_D reaches the allowed maximum PN number for signaling message.

The digest shall be calculated over a field consisting of the CMAC key sequence number followed by the CMAC Packet Number Counter, expressed as an unsigned 32-bit number, followed by the 16-bit Connection ID on which the message is sent, followed by 16-bit of zero padding (for the header to be aligned with AES block size) and followed by the entire MAC management message with the exception of the CMAC TLV.

The least significant bits of the digest shall be truncated to yield a 64-bit length digest. The CMAC key sequence number shall be equal to the 4-bit AK sequence number of the AK from which the CMAC_KEY_x was derived.

I.e.,:

$$\text{CMAC value} \leq \text{Truncate64 (CMAC (CMAC_KEY_* , CMAC key sequence number | CMAC_PN | CID | 16-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message) )}$$

If the digest is included in an MPDU that has no CID, e.g. A RNG-REQ message, the CID used shall take the value of the basic CID. If basic CID is unknown (e.g. in network reentry situation) then CID 0 should be used.

*Change Table 37g in sub-clauses 6.3.2.3.9.18: as follows*

| 6.3.2.3.9.18 PKMv2 SA-TEK-Challenge message |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BS_Random</td>
<td>A freshly generated random number of 64bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKID</td>
<td>BS transmits newly assigned AKID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAC_Tuple/HMAC_Tuple</td>
<td>Message integrity tuple for this message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key lifetime</td>
<td>PMK lifetime, this attribute shall include only follows EAP-based authorization or EAP-based re-authorization procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed maximum PN number</td>
<td>Allowed maximum PN number for signaling connection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[Change the Table 370 in sub-clause 11.9:]

11.9 PKM-REQ/RSP management message encodings

Table 370-PKM attribute types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>PKM attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allowed Maximum PN Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>SS_RANDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>… Rest of the attributes of this table remains the same.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Add the following sub-clause in the section 11.9:]

11.9.x Allowed maximum PN number

Description: This attribute indicates the maximum PN number which the MS can use when CMAC-value or short-HMAC digest is generated. The MS shall initiate re-authentication when the CMAC_PN_* reaches the allowed maximum PN number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operator-specific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>