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Re: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG



Hello All,
I agree with Lily on her comments. Perhaps we can restate them as requirements as follows:
 
1. An end-to-end security mechanism should be used for securing the MIH protocol. In particular, security services (mutual authentication, message confidentiality and integrity)
should be provided at the MIH layer.
2. The security of the MIH protocol messages  should not depend on the security of the underlying transport mechanism.
    Note that different transport protocols have different security mechanisms. Moreover, the message may not be secure while passing through intermediate nodes.
   The alternative is IPSec. However, we cannot assume that IPSec will be available.
 
I also agree with the suggestion of binding 1. Mutual authentication, 2. Key establishment for message protection, 3. Message protection (confidentiality+integrity). This might
be the case if an authentication method is used, which, in addition to authenticating entities, also derives key/keys which can be used as message confidentiality/integrity keys. 
PKI is perhaps too 'heavy'.
 
Any comments on the above?
 
Regards,
Rahul Sinha
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2008 7:49 AM
Subject: Re: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG

Hi Lily, Maryna, Peretz,Yoshi,
 
Thank you for the responses, helping us to make progress here.
 
Maryna, Peretz, regarding the use of MIIS in unauthenticated state... that use case is supported for NWDS acceleration by .16 and .11. We have assumed that the use of the MIIS at L2 would mean that the PoA would not trust the MN even if the MN is currently associated to the PoA's network through a different PoA. Could it be possible for the MN to already trust the new PoA however, if it is in the same network as the current PoA? What would it take to make that a possibility? Of course the mobile node may use the information as a hint even if there is no authentication (as is done today with the beacon)
 
For this use case, one of the main concerns expressed in .11 was that of DoS attack from the MN. Were there similar concerns from .16?
 
Lily, regarding use of MIH when the MN is authenticated to the network, you mentioned that for most correct usage, the four aspects of 1,2,3 plus replay protection must be mandatory to use, regardless of the transport level use of those four aspects. As a result, we may have L2 use of these four protections, then L3 use of them (e.g. ipsec), then the MSTP layer, and then the MIH layer, is that what we are suggesting?
 
BR,
Michael
 
 
 


From: ext Lily Chen [mailto:llchen@NIST.GOV]
Sent: 07 February, 2008 11:26
To: STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG

We have a few relative security aspects:

1. Mutual authentication (entity authentication).
2. Key establishment for message protection.
3. Message protections (encryption and integrity protection).

If we want to make sure that MN receives information from a correct source, then we have to bind 1-2-3 together so that the message is authenticated by the entity which have authenticated in 1. Entity authentication does not imply message authentication (integrity protection).  That is, we cannot depend on transport protection, since the transport layer ID for the service unit may not be the same as the MIH ID.  The transport layer mutual authentication may not mean MIH mutual authentication. Furthermore, the protection may be applied hop-by-hop instead of end-to-end. The information receiver may not be able to get any assurance on where the  information comes from.

There are some options if MN can access a PKI which is media independent and if the protection is applied at MIH protocol, then the information can be authenticated by digital signatures, verifiable by MN without step 1 and step 2 we listed in the above. In this case, other cautions must be taken, for example, to prevent re-play attacks.

However, these are just IFs. We need discuss how applicable these IFs are.

Regards,

Lily


At 04:23 AM 2/5/2008, komarova wrote:
Hi all,

MN to IS authentication may be optional, but IS to MN authentication should be mandatory in order to provide guarantee that the MN receives information from a correct source.

Best regards,
Maryna Komarova

Yoshihiro Ohba a écrit :

Hi Perets,

This topic is important for SSG TR.

On Sun, Feb 03, 2008 at 01:54:07AM -0600, Feder, Peretz (Peretz) wrote:
 

Michael: We actually were planning to use IS in 802.16 before the 802.16
full authentication, if now required we may loose the pre-authentication
network entry flexibility.   

This leads to an issue on whether the security feature to be defined
by a new project (if approved) should be mandatory to use or option to
use.  We may need to define it as option to use at least for IS,
considering the 802.16 usage mentioned above as well as GAS usage in
802.11u.  We may need to investigate the same issue for ES and CS as
well.

Regards,
Yoshihiro Ohba


 


________________________________

From: Michael G Williams [ mailto:Michael.G.Williams@NOKIA.COM] Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 8:15 PM
To: STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG


Hi,
In the security study group, we discussed the need for MIHF level
authentication.
There were a few topics in this area:
What do people see as serving as the basis for credentials for the MIHF?


Is it possible to reuse the network access authentication or MSTP
transport authentication for the MIHF level?
Is mutual authentication always required, or is one way sufficient for
some applications?
Is the need for authentication different between the four different
services (management, ES, IS, CE)?
Comments? Proposed solutions?
Best Regards, Michael