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RE: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG



Hi, Michael:

Please look at my another e-mail sent this morning, where I emphasize and promote discussions on big IFs to see what is the goal and what is needed.

The following e-mail is to answer your question about why if L3 have 1, 2, and 3 established why need to do it on L2 as well.  It is not my intention to propose one way or another wrt mandatory or optional. It is up to the group to make a decision.

Regards,

Lily


At 01:59 PM 2/8/2008, Michael.G.Williams@nokia.com wrote:
Hi Lily,
 
Layering of security is a familiar concept, and the ideal. Also, end to end security is the ideal as well. However in some typical deployment scenarios, do we need to have the ideals in place as always mandatory to use? The existing TR suggests that not all MIH security requirements are SHALL, some are MAY.
 
For example, in the IETF MIPSHOP MSTP, the security techniques are specified, so that when transport security is deployed, specific methods are mandatory to use. However the use of transport security is a deployment option, or, if I can coin a phrase,  'connection time' option.
 
Can we have MIH security methods be a profile (or profiles), so that there are deployment options? The concern is that if the network architecture doesn't need end to end security at the  MIH layer, forcing it to be mandatory to use in all deployments might make the network designer solve the MIH problem a different way.
 
BR,
Michael
 


From: ext Lily Chen [ mailto:llchen@NIST.GOV]
Sent: 08 February, 2008 06:57
To: STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG

Michael:

MIH is delivered by either L3 or L2. If it is delivered by L3, then the protections will be applied at L3 or higher.  Then L2 would not need to know what is delivered. Whatever specified at L2 will not be related to MIH. 

For example, you are doing home banking from your laptop at home through a wireless connection. You log in to your bank account, establish a SSL (or TLS) link.  This is end-to-end between the bank application in your laptop and the bank server.  You have to do so since you need to know that you are on a right server.  This connection is established for your banking activity.  Now your wireless link between the laptop and wireless harbor may also be protected at link layer whenever you make your connection. This link is not specific for your banking activity and even do not care what you are doing. It process each frame in the same way. 

For MIH, there is one procedure to bind 1, 2, and 3 for MIH purpose and from MIHF to MIHF. The others have nothing to do with MIH.

Regards,

Lily


At 09:19 PM 2/7/2008, Michael.G.Williams@nokia.com wrote:
Hi Lily, Maryna, Peretz,Yoshi,
 
Thank you for the responses, helping us to make progress here.
 
Maryna, Peretz, regarding the use of MIIS in unauthenticated state... that use case is supported for NWDS acceleration by .16 and .11. We have assumed that the use of the MIIS at L2 would mean that the PoA would not trust the MN even if the MN is currently associated to the PoA's network through a different PoA. Could it be possible for the MN to already trust the new PoA however, if it is in the same network as the current PoA? What would it take to make that a possibility? Of course the mobile node may use the information as a hint even if there is no authentication (as is done today with the beacon)
 
For this use case, one of the main concerns expressed in .11 was that of DoS attack from the MN. Were there similar concerns from .16?
 
Lily, regarding use of MIH when the MN is authenticated to the network, you mentioned that for most correct usage, the four aspects of 1,2,3 plus replay protection must be mandatory to use, regardless of the transport level use of those four aspects. As a result, we may have L2 use of these four protections, then L3 use of them (e.g. ipsec), then the MSTP layer, and then the MIH layer, is that what we are suggesting?
 
BR,
Michael
 
 
 


From: ext Lily Chen [ mailto:llchen@NIST.GOV]
Sent: 07 February, 2008 11:26
To: STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG
We have a few relative security aspects:
1. Mutual authentication (entity authentication).
2. Key establishment for message protection.
3. Message protections (encryption and integrity protection).
If we want to make sure that MN receives information from a correct source, then we have to bind 1-2-3 together so that the message is authenticated by the entity which have authenticated in 1. Entity authentication does not imply message authentication (integrity protection).  That is, we cannot depend on transport protection, since the transport layer ID for the service unit may not be the same as the MIH ID.  The transport layer mutual authentication may not mean MIH mutual authentication. Furthermore, the protection may be applied hop-by-hop instead of end-to-end. The information receiver may not be able to get any assurance on where the  information comes from.
There are some options if MN can access a PKI which is media independent and if the protection is applied at MIH protocol, then the information can be authenticated by digital signatures, verifiable by MN without step 1 and step 2 we listed in the above. In this case, other cautions must be taken, for example, to prevent re-play attacks.
However, these are just IFs. We need discuss how applicable these IFs are.
Regards,
Lily

At 04:23 AM 2/5/2008, komarova wrote:
Hi all,
MN to IS authentication may be optional, but IS to MN authentication should be mandatory in order to provide guarantee that the MN receives information from a correct source.
Best regards,
Maryna Komarova
Yoshihiro Ohba a écrit :

Hi Perets,
This topic is important for SSG TR.
On Sun, Feb 03, 2008 at 01:54:07AM -0600, Feder, Peretz (Peretz) wrote:


Michael: We actually were planning to use IS in 802.16 before the 802.16
full authentication, if now required we may loose the pre-authentication
network entry flexibility.   
This leads to an issue on whether the security feature to be defined
by a new project (if approved) should be mandatory to use or option to
use.  We may need to define it as option to use at least for IS,
considering the 802.16 usage mentioned above as well as GAS usage in
802.11u.  We may need to investigate the same issue for ES and CS as
well.
Regards,
Yoshihiro Ohba




________________________________
From: Michael G Williams [ mailto:Michael.G.Williams@NOKIA.COM] Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 8:15 PM
To: STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG

Hi,
In the security study group, we discussed the need for MIHF level
authentication.
There were a few topics in this area:
What do people see as serving as the basis for credentials for the MIHF?

Is it possible to reuse the network access authentication or MSTP
transport authentication for the MIHF level?
Is mutual authentication always required, or is one way sufficient for
some applications?
Is the need for authentication different between the four different
services (management, ES, IS, CE)?
Comments? Proposed solutions?
Best Regards, Michael