


IEEE 802.3 EFM

Ethernet PON, Security Considerations



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Security Basics

- Demanded by customers
- Two different issues
 - Authentication
 - Privacy
- Limited to protecting the shared medium

Authentication


- Plug and Play
- Based on 802.1x
 - Authenticator – OLT
 - Supplicant – ONU
 - Authentication server – Need to decide on central database issues
- The medium behavior enables the use of a simplified mechanism – to be discussed

Encryption

- Downlink data should be encrypted
- Two different approaches:
 - Add MAC level encryption
 - Use higher layer mechanisms, like IPsec
- Higher layer security can't be enforced
- Other shared media protocols incorporate encryption

PON Domain Encryption

- Encryption will exist inside PON boundaries



Frame Format

- No new fields are needed; format is maintained
- Encryption should start following Ethernet header and end after FCS



- MAC control packets are not encrypted

Churning

- APON uses a 24-bit key churning mechanism
- Churning is a memoryless transformation of one byte to a different byte
- Key strength is $2^{\text{key length}}$
- Drawbacks and weak points:
 - IP header
 - FCS

DES

- DOCSIS uses 40/56 bits DES with CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
- DES is a transformation of 8 bytes to different 8 bytes
- Having an initialization vector eliminates the weak points
- DES is fading out and not recommended for new designs

AES

- AES was designed to replace DES
- AES draft is ready. It is expected to be approved in several months
- AES is a transformation of 16 bytes to different 16 bytes
- AES supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key length

Last Block Problem

- Encryption block boundary may be dissimilar to packet boundary
- The last n bits ($n < 128$) will be XORed with the result of additional AES over the next-to-last block

Key Management

- Periodic rekeying
 - APON (Churning) – every 1 second
 - DOCSIS (DES) – every 12 hours
 - EPON (128-bit AES) – every $3E17$ years ...
- Two challenges
 - Key distribution
 - Key synchronization

Key Distribution


- OLT has a random number generator
- OLT distributes the keys AES encrypted with a special key
- Key distribution messages are acknowledged

Multicast Group

- Dynamic key management for multicast group must be supported
- OLT distributes the keys using the secured unicast channel
- Removing members from a multicast group is done by rekeying all other members

Key Synchronization

- Rekeying should not take place in the middle of a packet
- Precise time stamp is ineffective
- The OLT sends a “switch key” message with the number of packets until the switch



Recommendations

- Add security to the MAC layer
- Maintain standard Ethernet frame format
- Adopt 802.1x
- Encryption should base on 128-bit AES
- Use key management solution as presented
- Form an “Ad-Hoc” group for security?