


Formal Analysis of P802.1CB IEEE Plenary, Geneva, Jul/2013

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Proposed Solution





http://www.ieee802.org/1/files/public/docs2012/new-goetz-jochim-Seamless-Redundancy-1112-v02.pdf

Lessons Learned (from ARINC)




Redundancy Management requires precise knowledge of the communication latency and jitter of the messages on the redundant paths through the network.

- In certain cases the loss of a frame on one network can cause the loss of its copy on the redundant network.
- Sometimes, loss of communication requires to restart the sequence numbering.
- The ARINC 664-p7 redundancy mechanism is very well studied by academics and industry due to its importance and criticality for avionics systems.

Designed for closed networks.

Formal Analysis by Model Checking



Proposal – IEEE 802.1Q AVB/TSN Failure Hypothesis



Fault-Containment Regions (FCR):


- Communication Link
- End Station
- Bridge
- \rightarrow A fault is local to either an end station or a bridge or a communication link.
- → If more than one bridge / one end stations / one link become faulty then we have also more than one fault.

Failure Mode for End Stations and Bridges

- Permanent, Consistent, and Fail-Silent
- → In the case of a failure, a faulty FCR will stop producing output ("Fail-Silent").
- → A faulty FCR will behave the same on all ports, e.g., a faulty bridge will stop producing output on all ports ("Consistent").
- \rightarrow A faulty FCR will be faulty for the remaining mission time ("Permanent").

Failure Mode for Communication Links

- Transient or Permanent, Detectably Faulty
- → The communication link may drop frames or invalidate the Ethernet FCS on a per frame basis ("Transient").
- → The communication link may become unavailable for the remaining mission time ("Permanent").
- → Each failure of the communication link results in either a loss of the frame or an invalidation of the frame's FCS ("Detectably Faulty").



Talker Model

Ensuring Reliable Networks

```
talker: MODULE =
     BEGIN
     ...
     TRANSITION
     Γ
  if
     talker state = generate
     -->
then talker_state' = generate;
     []
       talker state = generate
       AND SN[1]<max SN
      -->
       talker state' = generate;
       SN'= [[c: TYPE channels]
```

SN[1]+1];

```
[]
  talker_state = generate
  AND SN[1]>=max_SN
  -->
  talker_state' = stop;
```

```
[]
  talker_state = stop
  -->
  talker_state' = stop;
```

END;

]

Channel 1/2



```
ch state = delay
 -->
  ch state' = delay;
  SN stored' = [[n:TYPE SN] IF n=SN IN AND n/=0
                    THEN TRUE
                    ELSE SN stored[n]
                    ENDIF];
  SN delivered' = 0;
Γ1
 ch state = delay
 -->
  ch state' = forward;
  SN stored' = [[n:TYPE SN] IF n=SN IN AND n/=0
                    THEN TRUE
                    ELSIF n=nextSN(SN stored)
                    THEN FALSE
                    ELSE SN stored[n]
                    ENDIF];
  SN delivered' = nextSN(SN stored);
% SN stored is a bitvector indexed by the SN
```

```
% SN_stored[i] will be true if the channel has stored SN i and
false otherwise
```

Channel 2/2



```
[] ch state = forward
-->
 ch state' = delay;
 SN stored' = [[n:TYPE SN] IF n=SN IN AND n/=0
                    THEN TRUE
                    ELSE SN stored[n]
                    ENDIF];
 SN delivered' = 0;
[] ch state = forward
-->
 ch state' = forward;
 SN stored' = [[n:TYPE SN] IF n=SN IN AND n/=0
                     THEN TRUE
                    ELSIF n=nextSN(SN stored)
                     THEN FALSE
                    ELSE SN stored[n]
                    ENDIF];
 SN delivered' = nextSN(SN stored);
% SN stored is a bitvector indexed by the SN
```

```
% SN_stored[i] will be true if the channel has stored SN i and
false otherwise
```

Listener



```
SN top' = IF list SN delivered[1] > SN top AND
              list SN delivered[1] >= list SN delivered[2]
            THEN list SN delivered[1]
          ELSIF list_SN_delivered[2] > SN_top AND
                  list S\overline{N} delivered[2] >= list SN delivered[1]
           THEN list SN delivered[2]
          ELSE
                 SN top
          ENDIF;
  SN acceptance window' = [[s:TYPE SN]
        IF s > \overline{SN} top' OR s < SN top'-ACC WINDOW
        THEN FALSE ELSE TRUE ENDIF1;
  SN accepted' = [[s:TYPE SN]
       IF (s=list SN delivered[1] OR s=list SN delivered[2])
           AND SN acceptance window'[s]
       THEN TRUE
                                                SN top
       ELSE SN accepted[s] ENDIF];
                    SN
                             2
                                            6
                          1
                                 3
                                    4
                                        5
                                               7
                                                   8
                 Accept
                         0
                             0
                                 0
                                    1
                                        1
                                            1
                                               0
                                                   0
```

```
SN_acceptance_window
```

Correctness Property

Ensuring Reliable Networks

all_accepted: LEMMA system |- F(FORALL(s:TYPE SN): SN accepted[s]);

F ... in all execution traces, there will be a point in time (FORALL(s:TYPE SN): SN accepted[s]) ... all SNs will be accepted


%Execution of the model:

> sal-smc network all accepted

Note: this is not a simulation, but rather an exhaustive search.

Counterexample – due to arbitrary delays in the bridges





Channel w. delay upper bound



In the model we simply add a delay counter that cannot exceed a particular value.

In reality this imposes a requirement of a known upper bound on the forwarding duration.

 \rightarrow With this addition the previous counterexample goes away.

```
Adding a faulty channel
```




```
[]
  c = FAULTY AND FAULTS_ENABLED
  -->
  SN_stored' IN {x: ARRAY TYPE_SN OF BOOLEAN |
        (FORALL (i:TYPE_SN): NOT SN_stored[i] => NOT x[i])};
```

We simply allow the faulty channel to drop messages.

This is modeled by allowing the faulty channel to set any value in the SN_stored to FALSE.


This behavior results in the following counterexample.





Proposed Solution





http://www.ieee802.org/1/files/public/docs2012/new-goetz-jochim-Seamless-Redundancy-1112-v02.pdf

Conclusion



We have analyzed a proposed solution to P802.1CB by means of model checking.

This analysis strengthened the assumptions that,

- the worst-case transmission latencies need to be known
- the failure mode of a faulty channel needs to be taken into account for the configuration of the proposed protocol.

We are currently analyzing how the particular transmission/configuration parameters interrelate, e.g., how large does the acceptance window need to be?



Ensuring Reliable Networks

In this analysis the SAL model checker developed by SRI International has been used: <u>http://fm.csl.sri.com/</u>



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