

This provides responses to comments ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 ballot of IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021

The voting results on IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021 in SC6N17703:

- Support need for ISO standard? Passed 8/0/11
- Support this submission being sent to FDIS? 7/1/11
- 1 comment with the China NB NO vote.

The comments have been processed in a timely manner using the mechanisms defined and agreed in 6N15606. This document provides the responses from IEEE 802 to the comments by China NB on this ballot.

China NB comment 1 on IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021:

ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1AC is implemented with IEEE 802.11 architecture and 802.1AE security technology. China NB has submitted comments regarding to IEEE 802.11 and 802.1AE because there are security technology defects in the two referenced standards (please refer to 6N15494 and 6N15556). However, ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1AC still adopts the two defective standards. Therefore, China NB cannot support this proposal.

Proposed Change:

It is recommended not to reference the defective standards and to enhance its security mechanisms.

IEEE 802 response to CN.1 on IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021:

The comment on IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021 is beyond its scope.

IEEE Std 802.1ACct-2021 is an amendment to IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018) and was developed to support the 100 Gb/s wireless switched point-to-point physical layer that was added to IEEE Std 802.15.3-2016 by the IEEE Std 802.15.3d-2017. As an amendment to IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AC:2018), it does rely on that standard: it states that the *amendment is based on IEEE Std 802.1AC™-2016 as amended by IEEE Std 802.1AC-2016/Cor 1-2018.*) However, the amendment does not specify or refer to the use of IEEE Std 802.11 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-11:2018) or IEEE Std 802.1AE-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2020). As the amendment does not reference these standards, the China NB's ballot response is beyond scope and does not apply.

The documents referenced in the China NB ballot (6N15494 and 6N15556) date from 2012 and 2013 and responses to comments were submitted from IEEE 802 at that time. The general assertions raised in the China NB's ballot were discussed at length in 2013 at an IEEE 802 meeting in Geneva (with IEEE 802 and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance) and in both 2013 and 2014 at SC6 meetings in Seoul and Ottawa (with IEEE 802, China NB and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance). During those meetings, IEEE 802 fully responded to all claims made by both the China NB and Switzerland NB representatives and also provided additional information about the design and specification of IEEE 802 technologies. Since that time, however, the China NB has failed to substantiate these assertions, despite numerous requests from IEEE 802.

The invitation for a representative of the China NB (as well as representative from other interested SC6 NBs) to attend an IEEE 802 Plenary session remains open.

IEEE 802 believes that the alleged security defects asserted by the China NB have all been shown to be not valid. Without technical substantiation of any related concerns, IEEE 802 cannot consider modification of the existing IEEE 802 or ISO standards.