

| Seq. # | Section number | your voter's id code | (M)ajor or (m)inor | Comment/Rationale | Recommended change | Disposition/Rebuttal |
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| 1 | 3.35 9.2.1 | DAS | D6.0 | “Net Allocation Vector” was changed to “Network Allocation Vector” in most of the document. These two places were missed. | Change text to “Network Allocation Vector”. | Fixed |
| 2 | 7.2.1.4 7.3.1.8 | DAS | D6.0 | Diagrams still refer to “SID” which has now been change to “AID”. Diagram in 7.3.1.8 still refers to “Station ID” rather than “Association ID”. | Change text from “SID” to “AID”. Change text from “Station ID” to “Association ID”. | Fixed |
| 3 | 7.3.2.7 | DAS | D6.0 | Diagram should add “(kus)” for the description of the “ATIM window” for consistency with other diagrams in the section. | Change text from “ATIM Window” to “ATIM Window (kus)”. | Fixed |
| 4 | 9.1.4 9.4 11.4.4.2.18 | DAS | D6.0 | Fragmentation Threshold. It is still unclear whether fragmentation threshold applies to the frame body or to the entire MPDU. Section 9.1.4 states: “Each MPDU is a fragment with a frame body no larger than aFragmentationThreshold.” The accompanying diagram shows the Frame body as not including the MAC Header or CRC trailer. Section 11.4.4.2.18 states: “This attribute shall specify the current maximum size, in octets, of the MPDU that may be delivered to the PHY. An MSDU shall be broken into fragments if its size exceeds the value of this attribute after adding MAC headers and trailers.” | Consistent treatment of fragmentation threshold. | Fixed |
| 5 | 9.6 | DAS | D6.0 | Some references to “Data+CF-Poll+CF-Ack” have been changed to “Data+CF-Ack+CF-Poll” in D5.2. For consistency, if this is the objective, then this change should be made throughout the specification; one occurrence was missed in 9.6. | Change all occurrences of “Data+CF-Poll+CF-Ack” to “Data+CF-Ack+CF-Poll”. | Fixed |
| 6 | 11.1.2.3 | DAS | D6.0 | Spelling “uupdate” should be “update”. | Correct spelling of “uupdate” to “update”. | Fixed |

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| 7 | 11.1.2.3 | DAS | D6.0 | <p>A new statement was added that is in conflict with PCF operation:</p> <p>“Stations in an infrastructure network shall only use other information in received Beacon frames, if the BSSID field are equal to the MAC address currently in use by the station contained in the AP of the BSS.”</p> <p>This is prevents hearing PCF from overlapping cells, see text in section 9.3.2.2:</p> <p>“Each station, except the station with the PC, shall preset its NAV to the CFPMaxDuration value This includes CFDurRemaining values in CF Parameter Set Elements from Beacon frames received from other (overlapping) BSSs.”</p> | <p>Remove the statement.</p> | <p>Author withdrew comment</p> |
| 8 | 15.2.3.5 | DAS | D6.0 | <p>The specification for the DS PLCP length now calls for the length in microseconds. An indication of how rounding should be performed.</p> | <p>Add text clarifying how to round the PLCP length field for fractional usec.</p> | <p>Author withdrew comment as is not an issue for 1-2 mbn phy currently specified - may be a subject of work if/when other PHYs invented.</p> |

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| 9 | 8.3.2 | DAS | D6.0 | <p>WEP receive handling for multicast packets still needs further resolution.</p> <p>Since multicast packets (ie. RA is multicast) are directed to multiple units, the receive WEP decoding for multicast packets cannot be based on the TA. The specification allows for a separate key for each RA/TA pair.</p> <p>To support reception of WEP encrypted multicast packets, where separate keys are used for each RA/TA pair, the multicast packets should be sent using one of the numbered keys (keyID of 1,2 or 3) which must be configured to the same values on all stations. Only directed packets would use the particular key for the RA/TA pair (with keyID of zero).</p> <p>The receive decryption process should be modified to first look at the keyID field. If it is non-zero, then the common key should be used. If it is zero, then the aWEPKeyMappings should be checked.</p> <p>See end of this document for proposed text changes.</p> | | Fixed |
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Proposed Change to WEP receive processing text in section 8.3.2:

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if the WEP subfield of the Frame Control Field is zero
    if aExcludeUnencrypted is "true"
        discard the MSDU and increment aWEPExcludedCount
    else
        receive the frame without decryption
else
    if aPrivacyOptionImplemented is "true"
        if (keyID is non-zero) or (there is no mapping in aWEPKeyMappings matching the MSDU's TA)
            attempt to decrypt with aWEPDefaultKeys[keyID], incrementing
            aWEPICVErrorCount if the ICV check fails
        else if there is a mapping in aWEPKeyMappings matching the MSDU's TA
            if that mapping has WEPOn set to "false"
                discard the frame and increment aWEPUndecryptableCount
            else
                attempt to decrypt with that key, incrementing
                aWEPICVErrorCount if the ICV check fails
        else
            discard the frame and increment aWEPUndecryptableCount
    
```