[STDS-802-11-TGBT] 回复: [STDS-802-11-TGBT] Transcript and PTK derivation comments
Hi, Dear Jouni,
I hope you’ve been doing well lately.
To help resolve this large number of comments as quickly as possible — and to reduce your workload — I volunteer to take the following CIDs from my side：
223
225
Thank you!
Best Regards,
Xuwen Zhao(TCL)
-----邮件原件-----
发件人: Jouni Malinen <jkmalinen@xxxxxxxxx>
发送时间: 2026年9月15日 9:14
收件人: STDS-802-11-TGBT@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
主题: [STDS-802-11-TGBT] Transcript and PTK derivation comments
The following three CIDs feel more generic than what I'm planning on covering in a single document. For now, I think it would likely be best to assign these to the commenter or someone else who could volunteer to work on these while I focus on all the other comments in the transcript and PTK derivation comment groups.
CID: 223
Page/Line: 49.47
Clause: 12.17.5
Comment:
For hybrid PQC profiles, the D1.0 specifies that the derived key includes both the classical DH shared secret and the ML-KEM shared secret. However, the protocol does not define an explicit peer-verifiable indication that all cryptographic components required by the negotiated security profile have completed and have been bound to the current authentication session. Parameter presence alone is not an explicit cryptographic proof of component completion.
Proposed Change:
Define a Hybrid Completion Verification value for PQC profiles containing more than one cryptographic component. The value shall be cryptographically derived from, or authenticated with a key derived from, all required shared secrets for the negotiated Security Profile and shall bind at least the Security Profile Number, the relevant transcript hash, and a session identifier. A peer shall verify the value before accepting the authentication/FT exchange as successfully completed.
The commentor will bring a contribution to address this comment and provide more detaild solutions.
CID: 225
Page/Line: 49.18
Clause: 12.17.3
Comment:
The PQC PASN exchanges may result in significantly higher computation and management-frame overhead than a classical PASN exchange. The D1.0 does not define a protocol mechanism for binding or reusing a successfully established PQC PASN key for a subsequent association or key-management session, which can result in redundant PQC key establishment.
Proposed Change:
Define a PASN Key Binding indication and Session Identifier. A STA may include a Session Identifier and a Key-Reuse/Binding indication in a subsequent Association Request or other applicable security exchange to request that the previously established PQC PASN key be bound to that target session. The peer shall explicitly accept or reject the requested binding in the corresponding response. Specify cryptographic binding between the PASN transcript, peer identities, target session identifier and the derived key to prevent cross-session reuse.
The commentor will bring a contribution to address this comment and provide more detaild solutions.
CID: 743
Page/Line: 34.44
Clause: general
Comment:
Several handshakes were updated with new ephemeral key generation to enable the derivation of the DHss and MLKEMss values, i.e., generation of public/private keys and ML-KEM decapsulation and encapsulation keys. The text is currently not explicit whether a peer must generate a new ephemeral key pair on every retransmission of a handshake message. Note that this refers to retransmissions at the higher layer, e.g., when message 1 or 2 in the 4-way handshake is retransmitted using an increased EAPOL-Key Replay Counter. Note that for other aspects this is occasionally explicitly clarified, e.g., "Generates a new nonce SNonce, if no SNonce has yet been generated for this 4-way handshake."
Proposed Change:
Where appropriate, make it explicit that ephemeral key pairs only have to be generated once per handshake execution. I hope to find time to provide a more detailed resolution, direct help and positive/negative feedback are always welcome in the meantime.
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