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Hi Mathy, Good collection of documents. There’s also draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke which is not an RFC but has been in working group last call (next stop before RGLC and then publication as RFC) for several years. CFRG is active for some stuff and a graveyard
for others. My draft is in the graveyard. But I think the issue is not so much when it was published as an RFC after it was adopted as a RG item. I think it’s better to look at when the draft became *stable* which is when other documents can start considering referencing
it. And given the fact that CPaceOQuake is based on other cryptographic work that has good providence—CPace, hash-to-curve, NoIC—I think the time to acceptable stability is not that long. That said, one of my gripes about CFRG is that its documents are doing more E than R, that is its more IETF than IRTF. IRTF is supposed to make tools, IETF uses the tools in a protocol. It used to be that IRTF documents didn’t need IANA
registries because they’re not proposing a protocol. Now we have all sorts of IRTF documents with IANA considerations. And they are proposing on-the-wire formats which not everyone needs. For instance, lv_cat(). 802.11 has elements. Our data already have length
indicators. We don’t need to lv_cat() an Information Element. That’s redundant, it’s overkill. But CPaceOQuake is specifying the use of lv_cat() when constructing the messages it sends.
Given the fact that the TG has already told 2 external organizations that we’re working on a PQ PAKE I don’t think we can punt this effort to “whenever the CFRG comes up with an RFC or a draft of considerable stability.” We need something
that is as faithful to CPaceOQuake as possible (given the requirements of 802.11) and then we need to closely monitor the draft to see if there are any substantial changes that we need to incorporate. This will be an ongoing concern as the TGbt draft matures.
The composition of these two PAKEs is discussed quite extensively and I think we can follow that text to define an 802.11 version of CPaceOQuake that addresses the needs of 802.11 but is not so rigid that it cannot change if considerable changes are made to
the CFRG draft. But I don’t think we necessarily need to be 100% aligned with the draft. This is not going to be showing up as an API to call in OpenSSL—e.g. “pmk = cpaceoquake(password, sta-mac, ap-mac, profile)—so we don’t need to treat it as a black box.
That doesn’t mean we should just roll-our-own though. The draft has some very specific, cryptographically justified, and well defined, key derivation and it would behoove us to not deviate from that. But if other aspects of the draft are not really compelled
by a use case, then just saying “well the draft says to do this so we’re doing it” is not right. Interested in other opinions. Regards, Dan. -- “the object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane.” – Marcus Aurelius On 10/18/26, 1:48 AM, "Mathy Vanhoef" <00006588701cd687-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote: Hello all, Making predictions is hard, especially about the future. Nevertheless, at least for me it was useful to look up the timelines of a few other recent cryptographic RFCs to have a comparison: - OPAQUE (RFC 9807): adopted in September 2020, published in July 2025. - SPAKE2 (RFC 9382): adopted in January 2015, published in September 2023. - OPRF/VOPRF (RFC 9497): adopted in July 2019, published in December 2023. - Hashing to Elliptic Curves (RFC 9380): first CFRG group draft in March 2018, published in August 2023. - HPKE (RFC 9180): adopted in June 2019, published in February 2022. Here, 'adopted' means adopted by the CFRG as a research-group document. The CPaceOQUAKE draft has not yet been 'adopted' (but may soon be?). All of the above are Informational RFCs. Of
course the timeline of CPaceOQUAKE may be substantially faster (or slower), but this at least gives something to compare to. > This IETF message seems to generate more doubts on basing PAKE on draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake: only an individual draft, not IETF standards, security analysis inconclusive, etc. Note that the authors already provide a formal security analysis of CPaceOQUAKE [1]. Further work analyses the security of the underlying PAKE construction and hardens against timing attacks
[2], and the hybrid PAKE combiner is analysed in [3]. The CFRG process provides an additional security review. Arguably one downside is that CPaceOQUAKE is still a fairly new security protocol, but at the same time, I am not aware of a better alternative. Best regards, Mathy [1]
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1343 [2]
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1399 [3]
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1621
From: Harkins, Dan <00003862fd143b8a-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Hi Tao Chun, On 10/15/26, 1:36 AM, "TaoChun Lee (李道軍)" <000062f6c3142c4b-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote: Hi all, This IETF message seems to generate more doubts on basing PAKE on
draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake: only an individual draft, not IETF standards, security analysis inconclusive, etc. It is an individual draft right now. It will not stay that way. Yes, it will be an informational RFC not a standard. Know what other things we use that are informational RFCs and not standards? HKDF (RFC 5869),
HMAC (RFC 2104), CCMP (RFC 3610), SIV (RFC 5297), AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394), ECDSA (RFC 6979). SAE wasn’t even based on an RFC. We have normative requirements in IEEE Std 802.11 that are based on informational RFCs all over the place. That should not be a determining
factor in whether we adopt CPaceOQuake or not. If the group still wants to leave option open for
draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake, on security framework side, suggest to be agile or hybrid with other (native) options. What do you mean leaving it open “on security framework side”? As opposed to what other side? What other option do you see on the security framework side? Also what do you mean “agile”? It’s already hybrid. Please
explain what properties you’re looking for in a PAKE. Regards, Dan. -- “the object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane.” – Marcus Aurelius --
Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards
| Communication System Design, MediaTek Inc. Email:
TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx
| Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com From: Stacey, Robert <robert.stacey@xxxxxxxxx>
Dear TGbt participants, See below for a response to our liaison. Note in particular the last paragraph on providing more input to the CFRG. Regards, -Robert
From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@xxxxxxxxx> Hi Robert, Peter, On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 03:05 PM, Russ Housley <housley@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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