| Thread Links | Date Links | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thread Prev | Thread Next | Thread Index | Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index |
|
Yes, I was referring to QFT in Shor’s algorithm. It has to finish a 2-D QFT before detecting the period. So the function of “probability of breaking ECC vs time” is a 0/1 function
(different from an incremental curve for other random trying methods). That’s to say, quantum attack has 0% chance to break ECC before the time needed to finish 2-D QFT and detect a peak in “frequency domain”. The time needed to break typical ECC curves is
estimated to be on the order of 1 hour by an ideal quantum computer. An non-PQC ECC-based SAE/EPPKE authentication method can produce a PTK and finish authenticated CSR and CSR Response to establish a PQC security certificate within seconds, then de-authenticate
and re-authenticate using 802.1x PQC authentication with the PQC security certificate to produce a new PTK, thus achieving PQC password authentication and key derivation. This method is already defined in WPA3 2026, except the part that has not required security
certificate to be PQC. It is not a pure PAKE. That’s why I said we have a readily available method as an interim method. From: TaoChun Lee (李道軍)
<000062f6c3142c4b-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Are you referring to QFT for Shor’s algorithm? Quantum threat model is centered around polynomial time breakthrough (compared to exponential), but is limited
by the small number of qubits. --
Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards | Communication System
Design, MediaTek Inc. Email:
TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx
| Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com From: Hui Luo <0000594db8d8d1cb-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
I was not in that discussion. If that’s the consensus, the FYI value of my contribution is to point out quantum computer attack needs time to finish QFT before doing any damage,
and existing methods can take advantage of this limitation. From: TaoChun Lee (李道軍)
<TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
I recalled there was a lunch discussion (Montreal?), and the consensus was to move to CPACE-OQUAKE-based mechanisms. --
Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards | Communication System
Design, MediaTek Inc. Email:
TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx
| Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com From:
Hui.Luo@xxxxxxxxxxxx <Hui.Luo@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Hi TaoChun, Yes, EPPKE with SAE is part of it. Please see my uploaded contribution for details. I think it can readily serve as an interim method based on what we already have, so 11bt experts
can take more time to define a good PQC PAKE method instead of rushing it. Thanks, Hui From: TaoChun Lee (李道軍)
<TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Hi Hui, By “An existing WPA3 method” you meant SAE? PQC PAKE path finding is on its next generation, with major focus on 1. Efficient signaling 2. 11-bt ownership vs external reference trade-off 3. Crypto agility …
and more. --
Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards | Communication System
Design, MediaTek Inc. Email:
TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx
| Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com From: Hui Luo <0000594db8d8d1cb-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Hi Stephen, If possible, could you add 11-25/2327 “An Existing WPA3 Method That Can Be Used For PQC Password Authentication” to PAKE discussion? I only need 5 minutes. It is for supporting
the view that we can afford to take time to develop a good PQC PAKE method. Thanks, Hui From: Stephen Orr (sorr) <000015666257037f-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks Mark, POCs that I have already spoken with:
Those are the big items. I think we may still need some discussion on some of the others that we classified as PDTs as we may be able to move them forward with individual
contributions Stephen To unsubscribe from the STDS-802-11-TGBT list, click the following link:
https://listserv.ieee.org/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=STDS-802-11-TGBT&A=1 To unsubscribe from the STDS-802-11-TGBT list, click the following link:
https://listserv.ieee.org/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=STDS-802-11-TGBT&A=1 ************* MEDIATEK Confidentiality Notice ******************** The information contained in this e-mail message (including any attachments) may be confidential, proprietary, privileged, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable laws. It is intended to be conveyed only to the designated recipient(s). Any use, dissemination, distribution, printing, retaining or copying of this e-mail (including its attachments) by unintended recipient(s) is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not an intended recipient of this e-mail, or believe that you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately (by replying to this e-mail), delete any and all copies of this e-mail (including any attachments) from your system, and do not disclose the content of this e-mail to any other person. Thank you! ************* MEDIATEK Confidentiality Notice ******************** The information contained in this e-mail message (including any attachments) may be confidential, proprietary, privileged, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable laws. It is intended to be conveyed only to the designated recipient(s). Any use, dissemination, distribution, printing, retaining or copying of this e-mail (including its attachments) by unintended recipient(s) is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not an intended recipient of this e-mail, or believe that you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately (by replying to this e-mail), delete any and all copies of this e-mail (including any attachments) from your system, and do not disclose the content of this e-mail to any other person. Thank you! To unsubscribe from the STDS-802-11-TGBT list, click the following link:
https://listserv.ieee.org/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=STDS-802-11-TGBT&A=1 To unsubscribe from the STDS-802-11-TGBT list, click the following link:
https://listserv.ieee.org/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=STDS-802-11-TGBT&A=1 To unsubscribe from the STDS-802-11-TGBT list, click the following link: https://listserv.ieee.org/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=STDS-802-11-TGBT&A=1 |