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Re: [STDS-802-11-TGM] DecoyAuth for TGmf



--- This message came from the IEEE 802.11 Task Group M Technical Reflector ---

 

Hi Jeff,

 

This sounds more like a use case with a viable hierarchical approach,

 

“DecoyAuth could be combined with Password Identifiers to allow for thousands of individual apartments to have their own Identifier, and then multiple non-guest and guest DecoyAuth passwords under the parent Password Identifier.”

 

Do we have a submission on this?

 

--

Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards | Communication System Design, MediaTek Inc.

Email: TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx | Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com

 

From: Jeff Hansen <jeff@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2026 3:26 PM
To: TaoChun Lee (
李道軍) <TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: STDS-802-11-TGM@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [STDS-802-11-TGM] DecoyAuth for TGmf

 

External email : Please do not click links or open attachments until you have verified the sender or the content.

TaoChun,

 

The original DecoyAuth implementation only supported a handful of passwords, and we have extended it to hundreds of passwords using fragmentation. Are you looking for more passwords than that? If so, DecoyAuth could be combined with Password Identifiers to allow for thousands of individual apartments to have their own Identifier, and then multiple non-guest and guest DecoyAuth passwords under the parent Password Identifier. In that case you’d only need a handful of DecoyAuth passwords.

 

As it stands with DecoyAuth alone, I wouldn’t recommend more than 500 passwords, but I did discuss some ways that it could be extended further than that with 1) interpolation matrix caching (included in our hostap implementation changeset), 2) purpose-built DecoyAuth hardware accelerators, but those are out of the scope of this project, though it is important to know what the limits of DecoyAuth are.

 

From what I know, the password identifier of 802.11bi is always sent in-the-clear for the first authentication. I do have concerns with Rogue APs causing a STA to reset back to a first authentication state (think of a user being unable to join the Rogue AP, then eventually forgetting and re-connecting), and send the cleartext identifier again.

 

-Jeff



On Oct 12, 2026, at 5:10 AM, TaoChun Lee (李道軍) <TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

 

 

Hi Jeff,

 

It seems this approach might have scalability issues for large password sets (avoid fragmentation), also with 11bi privacy enhancement, password identifiers are no longer cleartext over the air.

 

For separate authorization, probably we can give it more thoughts.

 

--

Tao Chun Lee | Tech Manager, Standards | Communication System Design, MediaTek Inc.

Email: TaoChun.Lee@xxxxxxxxxxxx | Phone: +886 3 560 0868 | Website: www.mediatek.com

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Jeff Hansen <0000650aeb4ec973-dmarc-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 
Sent: Friday, October 9, 2026 11:52 PM
To: STDS-802-11-TGM@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [STDS-802-11-TGM] DecoyAuth for TGmf

 

 

External email : Please do not click links or open attachments until you have verified the sender or the content.

 

 

--- This message came from the IEEE 802.11 Task Group M Technical Reflector ---

 

Hello all,

 

Thank you for the opportunity to present DecoyAuth to TGmf. I would appreciate technical feedback on the presentation and proposed normative changes:

    • 11-26/1971r0: DecoyAuth: Password-only multi-password SAE

    • 11-26/1982r0: DecoyAuth changeset

 

The proposal enables a station to authenticate using one of several AP-configured passwords without transmitting a password identifier. Our implementation has been exercised with 512 passwords, password-specific VLAN selection, PMKSA caching, MLO, and FT-SAE roaming.

 

I am particularly seeking review of:

    • The cryptographic construction and password-selection procedure.

    • The fragmented exchange, state transitions, and denial-of-service considerations.

    • Capability negotiation, fallback behavior, and completeness of the proposed normative text.

 

I also see potential complementary uses alongside password identifiers: multiple credentials under one tenant/account identifier could support owner/guest access, individually revocable device passwords, or overlapping old/new passwords during rotation. That extension is not included in the current changeset.

 

Specific clause references, suggested corrections, or pointers to existing mechanisms that address these requirements would be especially helpful. Guidance on the appropriate next step within TGmf would also be appreciated.

 

Thank you,

Jeff Hansen

Alta Labs

 

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