

P802.15.3 Draft 16 Comments

CI 00 SC 00 P 00 L 00 # 167
 Struik, Rene Certicom Corp.

Comment Type TR Comment Status R SEC

The 802.15.3 Chair directed the removal of all public-key key establishment mechanisms from the D15 Draft (see 03/054r1). It is however not clear at all on which rationale this decision was made. In fact, one can easily provide technical arguments that the decision lacks any justification and is not based on sound professional or engineering arguments. The 802.15.3 standard without proper entity authentication and key establishment mechanisms is a standard that cannot be implemented by industry, since it is incomplete. Moreover, no concrete suggestions are done how to provide adequate specifications for this functionality. Without this, this standard cannot be implemented by industry and will not be used or used with considerable delay. Last, but not least, the decision on what is supposed to be inside scope and what isn't seems to be based on arbitrary arguments. For a detailed rationale considering this comment, see the document I will post during the March 2003 Dallas meeting and the presentation I intend to give there.

SuggestedRemedy

Revert the decision to drastically modify the security properties of the standard. Re-incorporate all authentication and key establishment-related security mechanisms that were removed from the draft in the transition process from Draft D15 towards Draft D16. Re-consider all sponsor ballot comments related to Draft D15.

Proposed Response Response Status U

REJECT. The PAR of 802.15.3 limits the scope of our standard. There are many issues of an implementation that are outside of the scope of a MAC and PHY. For example, service discovery, network address resolution, routing and bridging are all outside of the scope of a MAC/PHY standard. The committee has used the experience with the public-key cryptography suites to ensure that the 802.15.3 MAC supports the use of these higher layer protocols to perform entity authentication and key establishment. There are higher layer protocols, e.g. 802.1x, that allow MAC/PHY standards to implement entity authentication and key establishment. The 802 leadership and the 802.15 working group chair both indicated that the inclusion of these security suites was outside of the scope of a MAC/PHY standard.

CI 00 SC 00 P 00 L 00 # 168
 Struik, Rene Certicom Corp.

Comment Type TR Comment Status R SEC

The 802.15.3 Chair directed the removal of all public-key key establishment mechanisms from the D15 Draft (see 03/054r1). It is however not clear at all on which rationale this decision was made. In fact, one could address Paul Nikolich's comments (as worded in 03/54r1) by implementing just 1 public-key security suite (this removing choice). This would allow a standard that is functional and complete and was also the initial intention before politics entered the 802.15.3 stage.

SuggestedRemedy

Revert the decision to drastically modify the security properties of the standard. Re-incorporate 1 authentication and key establishment-related security mechanisms, viz. the ECMQV security suite that was removed from the draft in the transition process from Draft D15 towards Draft D16. Re-consider all sponsor ballot comments related to Draft D15.

Proposed Response Response Status U

REJECT. The SBRC voted 11 to 1 to remove the public-key cryptography suites, per the recommendation from the 802 SEC chair and the 802.15 working group chair. The SBRC agreed that the inclusion of these suites could be seen as being outside of the scope of the PAR which limits the standard to the MAC and PHY only. The decision to remove the security suites was affirmed by the working group in the closing plenary of the Ft. Lauderdale meeting as well. The issue of the inclusion of the public-key cryptography suites was not that there were more than one option, but rather that the authentication process took place in layers above the MAC and PHY. Removing all but one public-key suite would not resolve the issue of the public-key security suites being out of scope of the 802.15.3 PAR.

The following are the twenty-five (25) new no voter technical comments received during the first recirculation. All have been resolved to the satisfaction of the voter but are offered for your review. The voter has since changed his vote from no to yes with comments.

CommentID: 19

CommenterName: Barr, John
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CommenterFax: 847-962-5407
CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 06
Subclause: 6.3.8.2.2
Page: 47
Line: 23
CommentType: TR

Comment:
The MLME decrypts the key, not the DME.
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Delete "decrypt and" from this line.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate:
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 21

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 06
Subclause: Table 13
Page: 49
Line: 2930
CommentType: TR

Comment:

The ReceivedFramePayload field should not contain the MAC header since it is provided in another field.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Delete ",and MAC header" from Valid range entry.

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

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Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 22

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 06
Subclause: Table 14
Page: 49
Line: 53
CommentType: TR

Comment:

SecMsgTimeout not included in parameters table.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Add additional entry in Table 14 following the SecurityInformation item:

SecMsgTimeout - Duration - 0-65535 - "The time in milliseconds in which the operation initiated by the MLME request needs to be completed before responding with a ResultCode of TIMEOUT."

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 23

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 06
Subclause: 6.3.9.2
Page: 50
Line: 1433
CommentType: TR

Comment:

Not clear what is provided when ReasonCode is:

BAD-TIME-TOKEN - Beacon header and payload?

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Add following text in 6.3.9.2.3:

"When ReasonCode is BAD-TIME-TOKEN, the ReceivedMACHeader is the MAC header of the beacon frame and the ReceivedFramePayload is the payload of the beacon frame."

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 24

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Clause: 06

Subclause: 6.3.9.2

Page: 50

Line: 1920

CommentType: TR

Comment:

The ReceivedMACHeader and ReceivedFramePayload fields have been added to the MLME-SECURITY-ERROR.indication primitive, but this technical change was never discussed by the SBRC nor is it documented in the running comments. In addition, there does not seem to be any other reference to how these field are to be used and clause 9 of the draft indicates that any frame received that fails the security check will be discarded.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Remove these two fields from the primitive since they are not required to perform any of the security related operations as defined in the draft. Delete "ReceivedMACHeader," and "ReceivedFramePayload" on page 50, lines 19 and 20. Delete ReceivedMACHeader and ReceivedFramePayload entries from Table 13 on page 49.

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. On page 232, line 8, change 'are discarded' to be 'is passed to the DME using the MLME-SECURITY-ERROR.indicate and no other action is taken on the frame by the MLME.' Also page 231 line 40 and all other occurrences.

ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/12/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/10/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 27

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: 9.1
Page: 231
Line: 1314
CommentType: TR

Comment:

The opening sentence has not been corrected to reflect the change from defining policies to defining mechanisms.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change the sentence on lines 13-14 to: "Security mechanisms provided by this standard allow security services to be implemented to control the admission of DEVs into a security relationship between the PNC and a DEV or between two ordinary DEVs and protect the information and integrity of communications between DEVs in a security relationship."

RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate:
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 28

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Clause: 09
Subclause: 9.1.1
Page: 231
Line: 1920
CommentType: TR

Comment:

This paragraph implies that the standard does not provide anything to support the authentication of DEVs. The Security Message (xref 7.5.9.1) has been included to allow implementation of an authentication protocol.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Add sentence following "...not specified in this standard.", "The Security Message has been included as a special command to assist in the implementation of vendor specific authentication protocols."

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Add sentence following "...not specified in this standard.", "The Security Message command has been included as a special command to assist in the implementation of vendor specific protocols for establishing security relationships and any related data.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 31

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Clause: 09

Subclause: 9.3.3

Page: 233

Line: 27

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Text implies that CTAs must be used to perform the authentication process.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change "DEVID and CTAs" to "DEVID"

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 33

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Clause: 09

Subclause: 9.3.5

Page: 234

Line: 4546

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Unnecessary sentence included

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Delete sentence "The MLME-MEMBERSHIP ... used to update and delete keys in the MAC/MLME."

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

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Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 35

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CommenterCo: Motorola

Clause: 09

Subclause: Figure 149

Page: 241

Line: 441

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Figure 149 still includes "Authentication state machine" entry when this is no longer defined in the standard.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Update Figure 149 to remove the four "Authentication state machine" boxes.

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate:
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 36

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: 9.4.2
Page: 240
Line: 910
CommentType: TR

Comment:

Use of "authentication status" not relevant to the standard. This should be security status.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change two occurrences of "authentication" in this sentence to "security"

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Change "authentication" to "secure membership" in two places.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/10/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 37

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: 9.4.2.2
Page: 243
Line: 2428
CommentType: TR

Comment:

This paragraph has not been updated to reflect the changes made to remove authentication and replace it with "membership in a security relationship".

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change:

Line 24: "such as a change in authentication state" to "such as a change in security relationship"

Line 25: "transitions from being unauthenticated to authenticated or vice-versa" to "changes membership status in a security relationship"

Line 27: "change in authentication status" to "change in membership"

RemedyEnd:

Response:

Change:

Line 31: "authentication status" to "security status"

Line 31: "successful authentication" to "change of membership status in a security relationship"

Line 32: delete "successful de-authentication"

Page 244, Line 1: "authentication status" to "security status"

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

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Clause: 09

Subclause: Table 63

Page: 244

Line:

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Another place where the exorcism of authentication processes has not been completed as required.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change title of Table 63 to "Security status changes"
Delete the Authentication and Deauthentication rows of Table 63 or replace them with Security membership change rows.

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Resolve as indicated in 03/160r2.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

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WrittenDate: 3/12/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/12/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/12/2003

VoterStatus:

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CommenterCo: Motorola

Clause: 09

Subclause: 9.4.6

Page: 248

Line: 2729

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Reference to authentication protocol that is no longer in the standard

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change ", but that are not part of the authentication protocol." to "."

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 42

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Clause: 09

Subclause: Table 64

Page: 251

Line: 1415

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Left over inclusion of vendor specific command used for de-authentication.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Remove "Vendor Specific command (related to de-authentication)"

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC

CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/10/2003

DispatchDate:

WrittenDate: 3/10/2003

Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003

Closed_UnsatisfDate:

VoterStatus:

CommentID: 43

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Clause: 09

Subclause: Table 65

Page: 252

Line: 1012

CommentType: TR

Comment:

Leftover content from old authentication protocol and state machines

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Change "When a DEV ... an authentication" to "When a DEV in the unavailable key state receives an indication that the key has been obtained"

RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Resolve as indicated in 03/160r2.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/12/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/12/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/12/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/12/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 44

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Table 64
Page: 251
Line: 3536
CommentType: TR

Comment:
Left over inclusion of vendor specific command used for de-authentication.
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Remove "Vendor Specific command (related to de-authentication)"
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT.
ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate:
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 45

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Table 65
Page: 252
Line:
CommentType: TR

Comment:
Vendor specific command use for de-authentication still left in table.
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Replace two occurrences of "or a Vendor Specific command related to de-authentication form the key originator" with "or a Security Membership command removing the DEV from membership in the group membership"
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Resolve as indicated in 03/160r2.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/12/2003
DispatchDate:
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Accept_RejectDate: 3/12/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/10/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 46

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Clause: 09
Subclause: Figure 157
Page: 253
Line: 34
CommentType: TR

Comment:
Leftover reference to authentication process.
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Change two occurrences of "authentication complete" to "security
relationship membership established"

May require more changes since de-authenticate also used in this figure.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Change two occurrences of "authentication complete"
to "security membership established". Also change de-authenticate to
"secure membership rescinded"

ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/10/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 47

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Table 66
Page: 254
Line:
CommentType: TR

Comment:
Old authentication state transitions still included in table.
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Replace with updated security membership updates.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Resolve as indicated in 03/160r2.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
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DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/12/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/12/2003
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VoterStatus:

CommentID: 48

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Table 67
Page: 255
Line:
CommentType: TR

Comment:
table still includes references to authentication process
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Update to include use of security membership command to update membership is a security relationship.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Resolve as indicated in 03/160r2.
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003

LastModDate: 3/12/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/12/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/12/2003
Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/12/2003
VoterStatus:

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Figure 158
Page: 256
Line:
CommentType: TR

Comment:
de-authentication command referenced in figure
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Remove and update figure as required.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Change text on right side of figure to read' to be 'Disassociate command sent or received, membership status rescinded or PNC handover.' Add text to page 233, line 54. ', i.e. the DEVs secure membership has been rescinded.' Add text to page 234, line 3 change "If the MembershipStatus is set to NON-MEMBER, the MLME shall ..." to be 'If the MembershipStatus is set to NON-MEMBER, the DEV's secure membership is rescinded and the MLME shall ...'.

ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C
Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
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DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
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VoterStatus:

CommentID: 50

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 09
Subclause: Figure 159
Page: 259
Line:
CommentType: TR

Comment:
Leftover authentication process in Figure 159
CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:
Change de-authentication to more appropriate security membership change.
RemedyEnd:

Response:
ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. Change text on right side of figure to read' to be
'Disassociate command sent or received, membership status rescinded or
PNC handover.'
ResponseEnd:
CommentStatus: A
ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
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WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
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Closed_UnsatisfDate: 3/10/2003
VoterStatus:

CommentID: 51

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CommenterCo: Motorola
Clause: 10
Subclause: 10.1
Page: 263
Line: 1317
CommentType: TR

Comment:

The description concerning selection of an authentication method, the use of particular commands, and an authentication process are outside the scope of the standard and should not be included.

CommentEnd:

SuggestedRemedy:

Remove this paragraph since it does not represent any facts defined in the standard.

RemedyEnd:

Response:

ACCEPT.

ResponseEnd:

CommentStatus: A

ResponseStatus: C

Topic: SEC
CreateDate: 3/9/2003
LastModDate: 3/10/2003
DispatchDate:
WrittenDate: 3/10/2003
Accept_RejectDate: 3/10/2003
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VoterStatus: