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Re:	Contribution on comments to IEEE P802.16e/D5	
Abstract	In this contribution, we propose to enhance the pre-authentication concept to the various cases of authorization modes.	
Purpose	Adoption	
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Enhancement of Pre-authentication for PKMv2

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1. Problem Statement

There are some problems in pre-authentication concept in the draft specification P802.16e/D5a.

1) There are various types of authorization modes in PKMv2, such as RSA with EAP, RSA-only mode, EAP-only mode, etc. Current pre-authentication mechanism for PKMv2 in P802.16e/D5a is only applicable to the EAP-only authorization mode. In section 7.7 Pre-authentication, it is described as:

“The pre-authenticated MSS may skip the authorization and EAP stages of network entry. The primary keying material available at the BS and MSS shall be computed PMK as defined in 7.x.x.x Key Hierarchy. Therefore the AK computation will be based on the PMK and not the PAK, consistent with the AK computation rules in the PKMv2 key hierarchy.”

Therefore, the pre-authentication mechanism should be enhanced to support various types of authorization modes.

2) In 6.3.2.3.9.16 Pre-Auth-Request message and 6.3.2.3.9.17 Pre-Auth-Reply message, and 6.3.2.3.9.18 Pre-Auth-Reject message, the message authentication mode supported is only for OMAC Tuple. But, the HMAC tuple can be used as in the case of authorization policy is negotiated in the SBC-REQ/SBC-RSP step to use the HMAC tuple than OMAC tuple. Therefore, it should be enhanced to support both of them.

3) In PKMv2 Key Hierarchy, (*adopted in session #34 but not reflected in the draft specification*) requires that the AAID is considered as a highest level of hierarchy in key hierarchy mechanism in PKMv2. But, currently in the pre-authentication mechanism in the draft specification, there is no means to exchange the AAID between the MSS and the target BS. Therefore, it should be enhanced to include the AAID parameters in Pre-Auth-Request/Pre-Auth-Reply messages.

2. Summary of Solution

In PKMv2 (*PKMv2 Key Hierarchy is adopted in session #34, but not fully reflected in the draft specification P802.16e/D5a. Therefore, in this contribution, we described the concept based on the adopted contributions C802.16e-04/217r1 and C802.16e-04/564*), according to the negotiated authorization policy four cases of AK derivation is possible:

If (the authorization exchange has been used yielding a PAK and the EAP authentication exchange has been used, yielding an MSK) then

$$AK = \text{Dot16KDF}(\text{PMK}, \text{SSID} \parallel \text{BSID} \parallel \text{AAID} \parallel \text{KDK} \parallel \text{PAK} \parallel \text{“AK”}, 160);$$

Else If (the authorization exchange has been used yielding PAK and the EAP authentication exchange has been used, but not yielding an MSK) then

$$AK = \text{Dot16KDF}(0, \text{SSID} \parallel \text{BSID} \parallel \text{AAID} \parallel \text{KDK} \parallel \text{PAK} \parallel \text{“AK”}, 160);$$

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Else if (the EAP authentication exchange has been used, yielding an MK) then
    AK = Dot16KDF(PMK, SSID || BSID || "AK", 160);
Else if (the authorization exchange has been used) then
    AK = Dot16KDF(0, SSID|| BSID|| AAID|| KDK|| PAK|| "AK", 160);
Else
    No security mode is selected
End if

```

In Figure 1, the general PKMv2 key hierarchy concept is described.

Currently, the Pre-authentication is applied to the PMK, not PAK. In Figure 1, only the right branch of the key hierarchy tree can be applied the pre-authentication for fast handover. But for most of the cases including the left branch of the key hierarchy tree (the RSA only case, RSA with EAP yielding an MK case, and the RSA with EAP not yielding an MK case), the pre-authentication cannot be applied.

If the serving BS and the target BS pair can support the pre-authentication, then the pre-authentication concept is supported by small changes on the current specification.

The PAK is a cryptographically strong randomly generated number at BS (but not having the BS-dependency such as BSID) and the MSK is the master session key shared between the MSS and the AAA server, and the PMK is the leftmost 160 bits of MSK (There is no BS-dependency). Current mechanism of the pre-authentication provide the target BS with the same PMK and the SSID, so the target BS and the handover MSS can generated the same AK using the shared PMK, BSID, and SSID (SS's MAC Address):

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PMK = leftmost 160 bits of the MSK (Master Session Key)
AK = Dot16KDF( PMK|| SSID|| BSID|| "AK", 160)

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Then the MSS and the target BS can generate all the required keys for security support without re-authentication procedures during handover.




Figure 1. Description of the PKMv2 Key Hierarchy

To enhance this mechanism to every case of the authentication mode, the MSS and the target BS shall share not only the PMK, but also the PAK. During the HO procedure the serving BS transfer the MSS's capability information to the target BS, and then the target BS know the authorization capability of the MSS. Therefore, the MSS and the target BS can generate the same AK using the same AK generating rule for the initial network entry procedure, without PKM message transaction between them over the air.

The PAK and the PMK sharing method between them is out-of-scope of the specification. There can be two possible methods: 1) Transfer the PMK and the PAK from the old serving BS to the target BS. 2) ASA server (including the AAA server conceptually) distribute the same MK and PMK to the target BS.

If the target BS get the PMK and the PAK, then the MSS and the target BS can derive the same AK between them using the PMK, PAK, and SSID, BSID, AAID, and KDK by the following step:

Derive the AK using the AK generating rule:

If (the authorization exchange has been used yielding a PAK and the EAP authentication exchange has been used, yielding an MSK) then

$$AK = \text{Dot16KDF}(\text{PMK}, \text{SSID} \parallel \text{BSID} \parallel \text{AAID} \parallel \text{KDK} \parallel \text{PAK} \parallel \text{"AK"}, 160);$$

Else If (the authorization exchange has been used yielding PAK and the EAP authentication exchange has been used, but not yielding an MSK) then

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    AK = Dot16KDF(0, SSID || BSID || AAID || KDK || PAK || "AK", 160);
Else if (the EAP authentication exchange has been used, yielding an MSK) then
    AK = Dot16KDF(PMK, SSID || BSID || "AK", 160);
Else if (the authorization exchange has been used) then
    AK = Dot16KDF(0, SSID || BSID || AAID || KDK || PAK || "AK", 160);
Else
    No security mode is selected
End if

```

Therefore, we can apply the pre-authentication in any case of the authorization mode negotiated.

3. Proposed Text Changes

[In P802.16e/D5, Modify the Section 7.7 as follows:]

7.7 Pre-authentication

After a HO-REQ/RSP exchange, an MSS may seek to use pre-authentication to effect a fast handover. An MSS seeking to use pre-authentication shall transmit a PKM_PREAUTH-REQ.

A BS on receipt of a PKM-PREAUTH-REQ message shall reply with a PKM-PREAUTH-RSP message, or with a PKM_PREAUTH-REJECT message.

A BS may send an unsolicited PKM_PREAUTH-RSP message.

A PKM-PREAUTH-RSP indicates that the chosen BS is populated with a PMK coupled to the identity of the requesting MSS and the PAK transferred from the serving BS or ASA server.

The pre-authenticated MSS may skip the authorization and EAP stages of network entry. The primary keying material available at the BS and MSS shall be the computed using the PMK and the PAK as defined in 7.x.x.x key Hierarchy. Therefore the AK computation will be based on the PMK and or not the PAK depending on the authorization mode of the MSS and the target BS, consistent with the AK computation rules in the PKMv2 key hierarchy.

[In P802.16e/D5, Modify the Section 6.3.2.9.16 as follows:]

6.3.2.3.9.16 Pre-authentication Request message

The message is sent by MSS to BS to establish ~~Pairwise-Primary~~ Master Key (PMK) with Target BS for Handoff.

Code: 18

Attributes are shown in Table 37f.

Table 37f – PKM Pre-Auth-Request attribute

Attribute	Contents
Target BSID	The BSID that an MSS will connect after HO
OMAC/HMAC Tuple	Message Digest calculated using OMAC_KEY/HMAC_KEY

The Target BSID attribute contains one or more target BSID that MSS notified Serving BS for Handoff.

The OMAC/HMAC Tuple attribute shall be the final attribute in the message's attribute list. Inclusion of the keyed digest allows the receiving MSS to authenticate the Pre Auth Request.

[In P802.16e/D5, Modify the Section 6.3.2.9.17 as follows:]

6.3.2.3.9.17 Pre-Authentication Reply message

Sent by the BS to a client SS in response to Pre-Authentication Request or in an unsolicited manner, the Pre-Authentication Reply message contains one or more Target BSID and OMAC/HMAC tuple that protect the message.

Code: 19

Attributes are shown in Table 37g.

Table 37g– PKM Pre-Auth-Reply attribute

Attribute	Contents
Target BSID	The BSID that an MSS will connect after HO
Authorization Mode	Authorization mode negotiated between the target BS and the MSS.
AA Descriptor	Specifies AAID and its type
OMAC/HMAC Tuple	Message Digest calculated using OMAC_KEY/HMAC_KEY

The OMAC/HMAC Tuple attribute shall be the final attribute in the message's attribute list. Inclusion of the keyed digest allows the receiving MSS to authenticate the Pre Auth Request.

6.3.2.3.9.18 Pre-Authentication Reject message

Sent by the BS to a client MSS, receipt of a Pre-Auth Reject message indicates to the receiving MSS, that the BS identified by the BSID in the associated Pre-Auth Request message and repeated in the response, is not populated with a valid PMK [and/or a valid PAK](#).

Code: 20

Attributes are shown in Table 37h.

Table 37h – PKM Pre-Auth-Reject attribute

Attribute	Contents
Target BSID	The BSID that an MSS will connect after HO
OMAC/HMAC Tuple	Message Digest calculated using OMAC_KEY/HMAC_KEY

The OMAC/HMAC Tuple attribute shall be the final attribute in the message's attribute list. Inclusion of the keyed digest allows the receiving MSS to authenticate the Pre Auth Request.