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Title **CMAC/HMAC-Digest Generation Method using the EIK**

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Source(s)	Seokheon Cho	Voice: +82-42-860-5524
	Taeyong Lee	Fax: +82-42-861-1966
	Chulsik Yoon	chosh@etri.re.kr

ETRI

161, Gajeong-dong, Yuseong-Gu,
Daejeon, 305-350, Korea

Re: IEEE P802.16e/D9

Abstract A PKMv2 Authenticate-EAP-Transfer message includes CMAC/HMAC-Digest. CMAC/HMAC-Digest in this message is generated with EIK. However, since there is no method for generating CMAC/HMAC-Digest by using EIK, it is necessary to specify the generation method.

Purpose Adoption of proposed changes into P802.16e/D9

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CMAC/HMAC-Digest Generation Method using the EIK

Seokheon Cho, Taeyong Lee, and Chulsik Yoon

ETRI

Introduction

0.1 IEEE P802.16e/D9 Status and Problems

A PKMv2 Authenticated-EAP-Transfer message contains the CMAC/HMAC-Digest for message authentication. The CMAC_KEY_* (CMAC authentication key) and the HMAC_KEY_* (HMAC authentication key) used to generate the CMAC/HMAC-Digest are derived from the EIK, which is derived from pre-PAK in the RSA-based authorization procedure.

However, the generation method for the CMAC_KEY_* and the HMAC_KEY_* using the EIK is not defined in IEEE P802.16e/D9. It is necessary to specify the generation method.

0.2 Solutions

A method for generating message authentication keys used in a PKMv2 Authenticated-EAP-Transfer message is proposed as follows:

The keys used for CMAC key and for KEK are as follows:

$$\text{CMAC_KEY_U} \mid \text{CMAC_KEY_D} \leftarrow \text{Dot16KDF}(\text{EIK}, \text{SSID} \mid \text{BSID} \mid \text{"CMAC_KEYS"}, 256)$$

The keys used for HMAC key and for KEK are as follows:

$$\text{HMAC_KEY_U} \mid \text{HMAC_KEY_D} \leftarrow \text{Dot16KDF}(\text{EIK}, \text{SSID} \mid \text{BSID} \mid \text{"HMAC_KEYS"}, 320)$$

Proposed Changes into IEEE P802.16e/D9

[Change sub-clauses 7.2.2.2.9 as follows]

7.2.2.2.9 Message authentication keys (CMAC/HMAC) and KEK derivation

MAC (message authentication code) keys are used to sign management messages in order to validate the authenticity of these messages. The MAC to be used is negotiated at SS Basic Capabilities negotiation.

There is a different key for UL and DL messages. ~~and also a CMAC key~~ Also, a different message authentication key is generated for a multicast message ~~for each multicast group~~ (this is DL direction only) and for a unicast message.

In general, the message authentication keys used to generate the CMAC value and the HMAC-Digest are derived from the AK.

The keys used for CMAC ~~key~~ calculation and for KEK are as follows:

CMAC_KEY_U | CMAC_KEY_D | KEK \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(AK, SSID | BSID | "CMAC_KEYS+KEK", 384)

CMAC_KEY_GD \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(GKEK, "GROUP CMAC KEY", 128) (Used for ~~group management messages~~ MAC multicast MAC message such as a PKMv2 Group-Key-Update-Command message)

The keys used for HMAC ~~key~~ calculation and for KEK are as follows:

HMAC_KEY_U | HMAC_KEY_D | KEK \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(AK, SSID | BSID | "HMAC_KEYS+KEK", 448)

HMAC_KEY_GD \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(GKEK, "GROUP HMAC KEY", 160) (Used for ~~group management messages~~ MAC multicast MAC message such as a PKMv2 Group-Key-Update-Command message)

Exceptionally, the message authentication keys for the CMAC/HMAC-Digest included in a PKMv2 Authenticated-EAP-Transfer message are derived from the EIK instead of the AK

The keys used for CMAC key and for KEK are as follows:

CMAC_KEY_U | CMAC_KEY_D \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(EIK, SSID | BSID | "CMAC_KEYS ", 256)

The keys used for HMAC key and for KEK are as follows:

HMAC_KEY_U | HMAC_KEY_D \Leftarrow Dot16KDF(EIK, SSID | BSID | "HMAC_KEYS", 320)

[Add following contents below Figure 135 in sub-clause 7.2.2.2.10]

7.2.2.2.10 Key Hierarchy

Figure 136 outlines the process to calculate message authentication keys derived from the EIK. The message authentication keys are used to generate the CMAC value or the HMAC-Digest included in a PKMv2 Authenticated-EAP-Transfer message.




Figure 136-HMAC/CMAC authentication key derivation from EIK

[Change contents of Table 37f in sub-clause 6.3.2.3.9.17 as follows]

6.3.2.3.9.17 PKMv2 Authenticated EAP Transfer message

Table 37f - PKMv2 Authenticated EAP Transfer attributes

Attribute	Contents
PAK Key Sequence Number	PAK Sequence Number
EAP Payload	Contains the EAP authentication data, not interpreted in the MAC
CMAC/HMAC-Digest	Message Digest calculated using EIK

