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[STDS-802-11-TGBP] 11bp SP request

Hi Bo,

 

Please help queue the following SPs for 11bp May meeting agenda?  They are also intended for SFD motion if SP passes. Please kindly notice that SP text may be updated before the 11bp Thursday PM session, per comments received.

 

Thanks,

 

Hui

 

 

SP1

  • Do you support to specify a low-complexity authentication and key generation method based on PMK, SNonce, ANonce, and PTK for secure AMP communications, where PMK is a high-entropy shared secret between an AMP AP and an AMP non-AP STA?
    • Notes: high-level authentication, key generation, and encrypted data exchanges are described below.
      1. The AMP AP includes a random SNonce in the first DL frame to the AMP non-AP STA.
      2. The AMP non-AP STA generates a random ANonce, derives PTK = hash(Snonce || Anonce || SPA || AA || PMK), splits PTK into TK and KCK, encrypts UL data using TK, generates a MIC using KCK for UL authentication, and includes the encrypted UL data, Anonce, and MIC in the first UL frame.
      3. The AMP AP derives PTK = hash(Snonce || Anonce || SPA || AA || PMK), splits PTK into TK and KCK, and verifies MIC using KCK. If verification is good, the AMP AP decrypts UL data using TK. If the UL data does not indicate more data exchange is needed. Secure communication ends here; otherwise the AMP AP continues exchanging DL/UL frames encrypted using TK. In the third DL frame, the AMP AP includes a MIC generated using KCK to finish the DL authentication.
  • Reference: 11-24/1203, 11-24/1548, 11-24/1998, 11/24-2112, 11-25/0831

 

SP2

  • Do you support to specify a low-complexity authentication and key generation method based on PMK, SNonce, ANonce, PTK for secure communications between an AMP AP and an AMP non-AP STA, where the shared secret PMK is derived from hash(SPA || P) with SPA being the AMP AP’s address and P being a high-entropy permanent secret built in the AMP non-AP STA?
  • Reference: 11-25/0831

 

SP3

  • Do you support to specify low-complexity methods for provisioning a device-specific shared secret PMK = hash(SPA || P) supplied by an AMP non-AP STA into an AMP AP for secure communications between them, without the need of programming or reprogramming the AMP non-AP STA, where SPA is the AMP AP’s address and P is a high-entropy permanent secret built in the AMP non-AP STA?
  • Reference: 11-25/0831

 

SP4

  • Do you support to specify low-complexity methods that can provision, reprovision, or deprovision a device-specific shared secret PMK = hash(SPA || P) supplied by an AMP non-AP STA into an AMP AP for secure communications between them, with the need of programing or reprograming only one bit in the AMP non-AP STAs’ non-volatile memory, where SPA is the AMP AP’s address and P is a high-entropy permanent secret built in the AMP non-AP STA?
  • Reference: 11-25/0831

 

SP5

  • Do you support to specify low-complexity methods that can provision, reprovision, or deprovision device-specific a shared secret PMK = hash(SPA || P) into a server and let the server manage secure AMP communications between an AMP AP and an AMP non-AP STA, where SPA is the AMP AP’s address and P is a high-entropy permanent secret built in the AMP non-AP STA?
  • Reference: 11-25/0831

 

SP6

  • Do you support to use random shorter local addresses for AMP non-AP STAs in secure AMP communications?
  • Reference: 11-25/0263, 11-25/0831

 

 

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